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Interference and Intrusion in Wireless Sensor
Networks
George D. O’Mahony, Student Member, IEEE, James T. Curran, Member, IEEE, Philip J. Harris
and Colin C. Murphy
Abstract—Wireless sensor network (WSN) systems for
safety-critical, space and internet of things applica-
tions have recently begun to adopt open standards
and commercial-off-the-shelf equipment, and persistently
face challenges of malicious intrusion and spectrum co-
existence. These threats are explored through Monte-Carlo
simulation and benchtop testing, including matched pro-
tocol interference and sophisticated, interactive intrusion
attacks. The need for expanding intrusion detection via a
more holistic approach, whilst simultaneously improving
WSN security, is illustrated. Discussions on WSN security,
vulnerabilities, and attacks are also provided.
Index Terms—Co-existence, Detection, IDS, Interfer-
ence, Intrusion, IoT, MAC, Mitigation, PHY, RF, Security,
Space, Spectrum, Wireless and WSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in safety
critical applications, such as space-based WSNs [1] and
the Internet of Things (IoT) [2], creates new challenges
in terms of security and spectral coexistence. Unlike
traditional wireless networks, (e.g. Bluetooth and WiFi,)
the use of WSNs in safety critical applications imposes
strict security and availability requirements on compu-
tationally constrained devices. A diverse range of these
safety critical WSN applications exist, where robustness
against harsh environments and maintaining low power
operation need to be considered. These applications
include, amongst others, wireless networked control
systems [3], space applications, for example, in-orbit
demonstration of an IEEE 802.15.4 protocol based WSN
on the International Space Station [4] and space wireless
local area networks [5]. Also, due to advances in the
development of WSN architectures [6], Low Earth Orbit
satellites can be used as WSN components [7] to receive
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aggregated packets from WSN relay nodes. Additionally,
WSNs are being utilized in aerospace applications for
aircraft control and health management systems [8] as
a first step towards fly-by-wireless and increased mon-
itoring capabilities. These WSNs are extensively used
in traditional monitoring and control applications, such
as, for example, environmental and surveillance [9].
Uniquely, arrays of nanosatellites are used in a WSN
approach to enhance mobile communications through
lower-cost, space-based mobile phone services [10]. In
modern society, the emerging IoT [2], which leverages
WSNs, is leading to the truly connected world and
smart homes/businesses. Each of these infrastructures
and applications require protection and attack detection,
as any attack could have significant consequences for
privacy and safety.
Security and availability of the communication link
are essential for any safety-critical wireless system.
These requirements are vital as WSNs develop into
an indispensable component of modern technology. Si-
multaneously, spectrum coexistence issues emerge, for
example, in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM)
2.4 GHz radio frequency (RF) band. This is mainly
due to (often changeable) large number of connected
devices potentially running different protocols at the
same frequency, location and time. These spectral issues
add complexity to providing the necessary security and
availability in WSNs, which are typically composed of
multiple autonomous, low cost, resource-limited and low
power sensor nodes running on a finite energy supply and
an open interface protocol for interoperability between
devices. Nodes gather data from their environment and
often collaborate to transmit the sensed data to a central-
ized sink, cluster head or relay node. In general, WSNs
need to share the frequency spectrum with multiple
services and need to coexist with both similar and differ-
ent protocols. WSNs are self-organizing, self-repairing
and operate a dynamic topology, which brings both
resilience to natural faults as well as a vulnerability to
malicious attacks. Due to their design, application space
and spectrum occupancy, a need for intrusion detection
and security against both malicious and unintentional
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interference is warranted.
This article uses critical WSN applications as a case
study to provide a review of WSN vulnerabilities, se-
curity and attacks, including co-existence intrusions.
ZigBee is studied through Monte-Carlo simulations and
benchtop experiments to highlight WSN security issues
and the need for intrusion detection. An intrusion de-
tection system (IDS) is used to identify the presence of
intruders. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices and
standardized protocols are used due to the general trends
towards the use of COTS components in commercial
IoT networks and in space applications. Both areas,
typically, favor high redundancy, high replenishment
rates over custom-built components. Examples include
the international space station [4], inter-satellite com-
munication modules [1] and nanosatellite swarms [11].
WSNs are commonly deployed in environments where
the spectrum changes rapidly due to the number of
connected devices, demand, packet size or services in
operation and changes in the physical environment due to
varying fading levels, obstacles, path losses, and spurious
interference. Beyond these non-malicious factors, critical
WSN applications may incentivize malicious attackers
to intentionally disrupt or compromise network opera-
tion. Presently, WSNs are highly susceptible to attacks,
especially Denial of Service (DoS) [12] attacks and,
as WSN operating environments become more diverse
and attack techniques develop, security improvements
are required. The challenges of system co-existence add
even more complexity and need to be examined, as
many modern WSN protocols adopt the same physical
(PHY) and/or medium access control (MAC) layers [9].
This phenomenon is explored by investigating the IEEE
802.15.4 PHY and MAC layers, which are utilized by
ZigBee and by various WSN protocols.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Section II gives a brief description of related work,
section III outlines the signal model used as a case study
and section IV provides adopted assumptions. Section
V summaries security in WSNs, section VI describes
various WSN attacks and section VII discusses specific
attacks using Monte-Carlo simulations and benchtop
tests. Finally, section VIII provides future directions for
enhancing WSN IDS design and security and section IX
concludes this article.
II. RELATED WORK
Interference and intrusion detection is not a new
area in wireless communication systems, but it is an
area which requires expansion and enhancements to
match the current trend of WSNs. Security for WSNs
is the most relevant work which relates to this article
and includes investigating applied security techniques
[9], threats to WSNs [13], how to secure WSNs [14]
and existing security issues in WSN protocols [15].
Additionally, related work includes research into WSN
attacks, where [16] provides a brief overview of attacks
and detection methods and [17], [18] focus on jamming
attacks and associated detection measures only. Flexible
and reliable software-defined reactive jamming is shown
to be feasible in [19], which provides attack deployment
evidence for the previous descriptive studies. Denial of
service attacks are outlined in [12], which also states
that security is the linchpin of good sensor network
design and detection can aide deployments. Research on
intrusion detection and IDSs includes using traditional
techniques such as analyzing the received signal strength
or packet delivery rate [20] and machine learning al-
gorithms developed specifically for detecting intrusions
on WSNs [21]. These machine learning techniques use
features such as packet collision ratio, delivery waiting
time and power consumption rate, to name but a few. De-
tailed surveys on intrusion detection in WSNs, the main
concepts, and the vital areas can be found in [22], [23].
However, this type of research is not confined to WSNs
as it is a current research topic across wireless networks,
in general, including Global Positioning System signals
[24], WiFi signals [25] and the coexistence of wireless
systems [26]. This article provides its contribution by
summarizing WSN security, vulnerabilities, interference
and intrusion attacks and detection methods. In contrast,
the literature above, typically, focuses on a specific type
of attack and the associated detection process. Hereafter,
critical WSN applications and an adopted WSN pro-
tocol are used as a case study to provide a review of
WSN vulnerabilities, security and attacks, including co-
existence intrusion. Notably, this article discusses WSN
attacks in terms of both the unlawful transmitter and the
non-compliant spectrum user. Whilst existing research
focuses on malicious spectral intrusions in terms of
jamming attacks, this paper highlights the idea of using
coexisting signals as malicious intruders. This paper’s
contribution is expanded by highlighting the need to
focus on WSN jamming for IoT penetration testing and
deployment security.
III. SIGNAL MODEL
Here, the IEEE 802.15.4 based wireless protocol for
low rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPAN),
ZigBee, is the chosen signal model, since, currently, it
is the de-facto standard for WSNs (as almost all available
commercial and research sensor nodes are equipped with
ZigBee transceiver chips [27]). The operating topology
is either star, mesh or peer-to-peer and, in each case, is
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self-organizing, self-repairing, dynamic and can exploit
clustering approaches [15]. Cluster heads are, typically,
used as relay nodes which aggregate and forward data
to a centralized sink. An example is using nanosatellites
as relay nodes (cluster head), allowing access to remote
areas by using the nanosatellites as links between each
cluster and centralized sink [7]. ZigBee is constructed
using the PHY and MAC from IEEE 802.15.4 and uses
a protocol-specific network layer, application support
sublayer and application object layer [28]. Relevant PHY
parameters are shown in Table I and three different
frequency bands are supported: a 2.4 GHz band (16
channels), a 915 MHz band (10 channels) and an 868
MHz band (1 channel). Here, the 2.4 GHz band is
selected and the 16 available 2 MHz wide channels,
which range from 2400→2483.5 MHz and have an inter-
channel gap of 3 MHz, have center frequencies as per
(1), where Fc and i are the center frequency and channel
number, respectively.
Fc = 2405+ 5(i− 11)MHz, for i = 11, 12, ...26 (1)
These frequencies are transmitted in the unlicensed
ISM frequency band and must coexist with various
signals including Bluetooth, numerous LR-WPAN, wire-
less local area networks and wireless metropolitan area
networks. Due to the unlicensed operation, global avail-
ability and relatively long-range, the ISM frequency band
is the first choice for wireless LAN solutions. To gain
access to the wireless channel, ZigBee uses carrier sense
multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA).
Table I
ZIGBEE PHY PARAMETERS
Parameter: 2.4 GHz PHY Value:
Number of Channels 16
Channel Spacing / Width 5 MHz 2 MHz
Data — Symbol Rate 250 kb/s 62.5 ksymbols/s
Chip Rate 2 Mchips/s
Modulation O-QPSK
Pulse Shaping Half Sine/Normal Raised Cosine
Spreading DSSS
Maximum Packet Length 133 bytes
Table II
ZIGBEE PHY FRAME
Synchronization PHY Header PHY Service Data Unit (PSDU)
Header (PHR) (PSDU)
(SHR)
Preamble SFD Length Payload CRC
4 Bytes 1 Byte 1 Byte 0-125 Bytes 2 Bytes
Prior to transmitting a packet, devices perform a clear
channel assessment to ensure the channel is available.
This technique is particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks
and spectrum-sharing difficulties.
ZigBee uses direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)
to split each outgoing byte into two 4-bit symbols, four
most significant bits and four least significant bits. Each
symbol is spread to a 32-bit pseudo-noise sequence from
a predefined mapping table. Chip sequences are encoded
using offset quadrature phase shift keying (O-QPSK)
with half-sine/normal raised cosine pulse shaping. Mat-
lab simulations, using random payload bits, produced
the example in-phase and quadrature phase (IQ) data in
Fig. 1a and associated IQ diagram, which illustrates the
constant envelope nature of the signal, in Fig. 1b. The
equivalent energy-per-bit (Eb) can be calculated using
the period over which one byte is broadcast (TByte) and





The packet error rate (PER) for a ZigBee signal in a
zero mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) chan-
nel was calculated to illustrate normal operation (Fig.
2). A range of energy-per-bit-to-noise ratios (Eb/N0)
were applied using a ZigBee frame (Table II) with a
randomized payload. The predicted PER was calculated
using the probability of receiving an incorrect symbol
(Pe), given 16 unique DSSS pseudo-noise codes and
an AWGN channel. Assuming a matched filter receiver,
the symbol error probability can be expressed as (3),
where σ (4) is the variance, erf() is the error function
and L is the number of codes. The corresponding PER



























PER = 1− (1− Pe)2∗NBytes (5)
The results express the PER for received packets
across an AWGN channel for normal operating condi-
tions. However, as will be discussed later, other con-
siderations, including miss-routing of packets, erroneous
transmissions or attacks, may occur. The predicted and
simulated results begin to differ as the PER reduces
because the mathematical model assumes the pseudo-
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(a) Simulated ZigBee O-QPSK modulated IQ data, with the IQ chip
offset and chip duration labelled








(b) IQ diagram for the transmitted ZigBee signal
Figure 1. Visual representation of transmitted ZigBee signal
Figure 2. Predicted and simulated PER for a ZigBee signal over a
range of energy-per-bit to noise ratios
noise codes are orthogonal but, in reality, there is a non-
zero cross correlation.
IV. OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS
Based on the literature, certain operating assumptions
are made, which focus on IDSs and how wireless net-
works react to an intrusion. Traditional wireless network
operation, typically transmitted packets, and attack meth-
ods were examined and the assumptions adopted herein
are as follows:
1) A reliable routing protocol is used and a packet can
always reach the base station, and other nodes, when
no attacks are present [20].
2) Basic jamming hardware in use may be similar to
network nodes [20], but notably does not have to
adhere to any standards, guidelines or rules.
3) Attackers can use advanced hardware (e.g. software
defined radios, computers) without adhering to stan-
dards, guidelines or rules. [29]
4) The attacker can place/seize one or more basic sensing
nodes in the network [20]. These basic sensing nodes
have limited resources and energy supplies, which
hinder the use of complex security algorithms. Control
nodes contain more advanced hardware and, as a
result, are more difficult to seize.
5) Nodes at the edge of a jammed region can receive
messages from “jammed” nodes and relay alarms to
the controller and/or base station [30].
6) Intelligent jammers can monitor the network and
determine the protocols being used [31].
7) Nodes can be deployed in environments where the
possibility of being captured exists [16]. Captured
(malicious) nodes can be used to implement attacks
on the network and can gain access to sensitive
data. An example includes a black hole attack [32],
which “pulls in” network traffic by listening to route
requests and replying that it has the shortest path. The
node can, potentially, alter, reject or replay received
packets. Section VI discusses other attack strategies
for malicious nodes.
Application specific assumptions also exist, for ex-
ample, encryption and/or a key management system
for data privacy may be of high importance in some
applications, while other systems might implement origin
authentication and data integrity but not encryption. Cer-
tain applications may not use any mitigation strategies,
while critical applications may use DSSS, frequency
hopping spread spectrum or a frame check sequence
to fortify against external interference. Consequently,
an application’s environment and the prevailing external
factors will govern operating conditions.
V. SECURITY IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
WSN applications require security, particularly when
the networks are designed for use in hostile environ-
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ments, military, aerospace, commercial or IoT applica-
tions [23]. Compared to other wireless networks, se-
curing WSNs to an appropriate level is challenging as,
typically, WSNs have certain unavoidable challenges [9],
which form a unique combination of vulnerabilities:
1) Open Interface: Normally, protocols are unavoidably
known publicly due to the requirement for inter-
operability between devices and protocols. Wireless
channels are open to anyone with suitable equipment,
enabling specific WSN attacks and access to transmit-
ted signals.
2) Device Resources: Typically, devices are deployed,
left unattended, must operate on a finite energy supply
and, for reasons of cost, have low processing power,
memory, physical storage, and speed. Generally, these
constraints hinder the use of conventional security
methods.
3) Operating Environments: Regularly, WSNs are de-
ployed without any fixed infrastructure in hostile or
remote environments, where it is difficult to have con-
tinued surveillance. Often, deployed legitimate net-
work nodes become physically available to attackers
and are susceptible to being captured. Therefore, a
sufficiently high probability of node secrets being
discovered and/or nodes being made malicious may
prevail, thereby obliging countermeasure(s). Tamper
proofing nodes is possible, but may not be appropri-
ate/available for all types of networks/nodes due to,
for example, cost restrictions.
4) Topology: WSN topologies can be dynamic and so
changes are expected due to variations in the chan-
nel/environment (e.g. fading levels, obstacles, path
losses, spurious interference, etc.), which may lead
to the “death” of network nodes and topology recon-
figuration.
5) Hardware Availability: Reconfigurable hardware, suit-
able for attacking networks, is becoming increasingly
available/accessible to a wider set of users/potential
malicious actors, who can readily design and deploy
more computationally expensive attacks [29].
6) Deployment Diversification: As WSN applications
continue to expand, the range of operating conditions,
use cases, and created data widen.
Inclusive of the WSN vulnerabilities above, certain se-
curity features are required [13], [14].
1) Confidentiality: The secrecy of important data being
transmitted in the wireless channel must be main-
tained. Classical cryptography can be adopted to en-
crypt critical data prior to transmission. However, a
strict key management system may prove difficult,
given WSN device resources.
2) Authenticity: Verifying packet authenticity is essential
as the receiving node should be able to autonomously
assert that the received packet has not been modified
in transit (data integrity), and from which node the
packet originated (origin authenticity). Cryptographic
schemes, such as digital signatures, can simultane-
ously provide both functionalities. Without this secu-
rity aspect, attackers could spoof node identities and
spread false information throughout a WSN.
3) Availability: WSNs need to provide services when-
ever they are required and, therefore, need to exhibit
qualities of robustness against a variety of impair-
ments, both benign and malicious. Some degree of
resilience (i.e. the ability to recovery from faults),
diagnostics (i.e. able to identify why services became
unavailable), or mitigation strategy (packet re-routing,
channel switching, etc.) is necessary. Appropriate use
of an IDS may help to ameliorate the network’s
availability.
4) Energy: Unique to WSNs, the constrained energy
levels impact upon all security plans. Typically, nodes
have a limited energy supply and, so, any security pro-
tocol or detection mechanism needs to take this energy
constraint into account, since optimizing energy usage
is vital for network longevity.
5) Data Freshness: Critical data circulating in a WSN
must be the most recent update and, as such, outdated
data should not circulate in a network.
6) Node Ability: WSN nodes must be self-organizing,
react to node/link failures and only authorized nodes
should be allowed to operate and share information in
a WSN.
Evidently, no WSN will be 100% secure and it is ex-
tremely difficult to design a WSN where attackers cannot
find some way in [23]. Timely mitigation strategies are
required to combat attacks that exploit the WSN vulnera-
bilities. This provides a need for security measures which
are either preventive, reactive or detective solutions [15].
Preventive measures include cryptography, spreading
codes, frequency hopping, frame check sequences, etc.
[9]. An IDS identifies the presence of intruders, so mit-
igation (or reactive) strategies can be implemented. The
fundamentals of intrusions and intrusion detection were
defined by James Anderson in 1980 and are; risk, threat,
attack, vulnerability, and penetration [33]. Additionally,
an IDS includes the delicate balance between detection
and false-alarm rates, which can be particularly chal-
lenging in environments where many different physical
layers occupy the same spectrum. Intrusion detection can
be achieved using different methods [22], [30]:
• Misuse Detection compares the action or behavior
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of transmitting/receiving nodes to well known attack
patterns. These attack signatures form the knowledge
base of the IDS.
• Anomaly Detection defines the characteristics of nor-
mal operation and activities and transmissions are com-
pared against this normal operation. The IDS classifiers
outliers, which are activities different from normal, as
intruders.
• Hybrid or Specification-based detection includes IDSs
which do not conform to anomaly or misuse. Normal
behavior is manually defined by human perception.
The focus is to determine deviations from this normal
behavior, when it is not defined by training data or ma-
chine learning algorithms. Certain hybrid approaches
can combine both anomaly and misuse detection.
The above discussion highlights the fact that security
plays a major role in WSNs, is integral for any successful
WSN based critical application and, typically, four pillars
of WSN security exist; vulnerabilities, requirements,
attacks and defenses [34]. Typically, networks have
defined requirements, e.g. confidentiality, and employ
specific defense strategies (encryption) to ensure each
requirement is met. Networks, especially WSNs, have
vulnerabilities and attacks can use these vulnerabilities
to, potentially, increase attack efficiency. A notable ex-
ample is the finite energy supply and, thus, attackers can
focus on this vulnerable point. Therefore, this implies
that the identified four pillars suit WSN security analysis.
Furthermore, given the 3D model for reliability provided
in [35], a similar approach can be taken for security, as
provided in Fig. 3, which establishes a functional model
for security using certain parameters. This model pro-
vides a simplified visual representation of some available
security setups for WSNs. The specified model analyses
whether a preventive, reactive or detection approach is
used as the security mechanism, is a Hop-by-Hop or
End-to-End basis applied and is security event-triggered
or on each individual packet. Here, hop-by-hop refers
to maintaining security across each and every link and
end-to-end refers to only the source and destination
maintaining security. Furthermore, typically, reliability
provides bit loss recovery whilst security specifies bit
loss prevention. Therefore, the topics can be linked in
terms of packet loss and the model in [35] readily adapts
to security.
VI. ATTACKS ON WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Attacking a WSN involves either unauthorized access
to data, data manipulation or denial of system services.
These WSN attacks can be categorized into either passive
or active attacks [13]. Passive attack styles do not mod-








Figure 3. A functional simplified model for visualizing different
security options in WSNs
the transmitted confidential data. Initially, this does not
appear to have severe consequences, especially if data
is encrypted. However, over time and given enough cap-
tured data, reverse engineering can provide the protocol
in use and grant network access or packet decryption,
which results in multiple network security consequences.
In contrast, active attacks aim to modify/remove streams
of data, cause a denial of service, disturb functionality or
disguise an attack as a legitimate node. For convenience,
a selection of known attacks on WSNs are categorized
and described, where the focus is placed on PHY and
MAC layer attacks, including jamming and congestion
style intrusions. Generally, it is envisaged that external
attacks, for example, jamming, will be implemented
using a software-defined radio approach. This hardware
provides the necessary ability to receive, analyze and
transmit. The internal attacks, for example, sinkhole,
will, typically, use a WSN device that has been captured
or identified. Attack effectiveness and/or affected area,
typically, depends on the strength of the transmitting
power or how “transparent” the approach needs to be.
A. Conventional Jamming Attacks
These active attacks, typically, aim to overpower the
legitimate signal with spurious radio-frequency trans-
missions. While higher jamming power increases attack
effectiveness, it also boosts detectability. As such, the
adversary is typically driven to optimize signal interfer-
ence to maximize packet loss, while minimizing total
broadcast power. Such attacks include:
1) The constant jammer continuously emits RF signals
of random data into the wireless medium without
following any MAC protocol, can be readily detected
and is energy inefficient. However, this jammer can
be easily implemented and causes severe damage to
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a WSN, as congestion or destruction of packets can
be achieved and the channel can appear permanently
busy.
2) The deceptive jammer regularly transmits protocol
specific packets into the network without pausing
between successive packets, thereby preventing nor-
mal sources from transmitting successfully. Due to
the transmission of legitimate packets, it is more
difficult to detect than a constant jammer and can
cause considerable damage in WSNs adhering to
MAC protocols, which are sensing for channel access
or the presence/absence of a signal.
3) Random jammers sporadically transmit random pack-
ets of data and conserve energy by switching between
the jamming state, when jamming signals are emitted,
and the sleeping state, when all transmissions are
ceased. This unpredictable behavior makes this jam-
mer difficult to mitigate and can cause similar levels
of damage as the constant and deceptive jammers.
4) A reactive jammer [19] operates in idle mode until
some legitimate activity is detected on the wireless
channel. A RTS/CTS jammer detects request to send
(RTS) messages and interferes with the channel to
block any clear to send (CTS) messages, thereby
denying further communications. Data acknowledg-
ment jammers corrupt acknowledgment packets after a
transmission has been sensed in the network and mis-
leads nodes to decide that packets were undelivered,
thereby invoking a retransmission and, potentially,
resulting in the exhaustion of the power supply. This
is particularly effective in protocols, such as ZigBee,
which use CSMA/CA.
5) Specific function jammers perform explicit functions,
depending on their calibration, and cause jamming
on either a specific channel or across an entire net-
work, while minimizing their energy consumption or
maximizing their attack effect. For example, follow-
on jammers jam one specific frequency at a time
and maximize packet loss by continuously hopping
between the channel frequencies. These jammers can
be detected but are very effective, particularly in
networks that use frequency hopping spread spec-
trum or when identified spectrum holes [36] are used
to improve performance through spectrum sharing.
Another example is the channel-hopping jammer,
which follows a predefined pseudo-random sequence
of channels and starts jamming at different time slots
according to this sequence. By overwriting the se-
quence, multiple channels can be jammed at the same
time. Finally, pulse noise jammers can be programmed
to switch between different channels/bandwidths and
conserve energy by temporarily halting transmissions.
B. Intelligent Jamming Attacks
Intelligent jammers are a combination of a passive and
an active attack, as the jammer initially targets network
privacy before inevitably targeting data packets. These
devices are more likely to cause jamming but are harder
to implement than conventional jammers [29]. Protocol
aware and statistical jammers aim to determine the MAC
protocol being used by the victim’s network in order
to launch energy efficient attacks [31]. Protocol aware
jammers know the MAC layer operating rules and can
deprive legitimate nodes of access to the channel and
can, potentially, affect services identifying free channels
or spectrum holes, used to, potentially, enhance spec-
trum coexistence [36]. Statistical jammers observe the
packet inter-arrival time distribution and, based on its
estimation, emit pulses of jamming signals to disrupt
communications (DoS attack). Once the estimation is
achieved, energy efficiency can be increased through
pulse jamming. Collision makers target the identified ac-
knowledgment packets by inhibiting transmissions. Cer-
tain intelligent jammers identify the cluster head/sinks
by monitoring the network traffic and focus attacks
on that specific node in an “Intelligent Cluster Head
Attack”. Learning based jammers, like LearJam, have
been produced to attack low duty cycle networks where
nodes sleep most of the time (a typical WSN character-
istic) and consist of a learning phase, wherein the node
transmission pattern is observed, and an attacking phase,
where these transmissions are compromised. Therefore,
clearly attackers are now able to learn the MAC and/or
protocols in use by eavesdropping (privacy attack) on the
channel for some period of time. This attack style could,
for example, be launched on techniques for sensing
the presence or absence of a signal (CSMA/CA or
spectrum sharing), by learning when a service should be
idle and producing “dummy” packets to avert potential
transmissions.
C. MAC Layer Jamming Attacks
These are, initially, passive attacks that react to the
network protocol in use by eavesdropping on or sniffing
transmitted packets to gain access to network infor-
mation. The analyzed results are used to implement
active attacks including replay attacks, spoofed packets
or forcing a device to remain in listening mode, which
exploits CSMA/CA. These are not jamming attacks but,
instead, try to mislead WSN devices. Replay attacks
should be negated by the use of message integrity
codes. However, due to hostile deployment scenarios,
secrets may be accessible as legitimate nodes may be
physically available and, if no key management system
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is in use (home personal COTS network), devices may
be available commercially and the keys extracted from
device memory.
D. Network-Layer Attacks
Generally, these are active attacks that interfere with
network operations causing either a DoS, a privacy or
an impersonation attack.
1) Sinkhole/Blackhole Attacks: In this congestion based
DoS attack, a malicious node acts like a black hole
[32] and “pulls in” all of the traffic in the network.
The malicious node listens to the route requests and
replies that it has the shortest path, maximizing packet
flow.
2) Selective Forwarding: Networks that rely on multi-hop
transmissions require all nodes to faithfully forward
any received packets to the base station. In this packet
dropping DoS attack, a malicious node in the routing
path selectively drops sensitive packets.
3) Node Replication Attacks: In WSNs, nodes are often
deployed in unattended public environments where
continued surveillance is unrealistic. In this imper-
sonation attack, an attacker may replicate a legitimate
node and introduce it to the network, thereby gaining
access to the flow of packets throughout the network.
This may involve the capture and analysis of a legiti-
mate node in cases where some level of cryptographic
security is applied.
4) Sybil Attacks: Many applications require node col-
laboration to accomplish a certain task. Applications
can then implement management policies to distribute
sub-tasks to different nodes. In this impersonation
attack, a malicious node will pretend to be more than
one node at the same time, using the identities of other
legitimate nodes to effectively cause collaboration
processes to fail and can target data aggregation,
routing mechanisms, etc.
5) HELLO Flood Attacks: Often, routing protocols need
to broadcast “HELLO” packets in order to discover
one-hop neighbors. The attacker exploits this concept
to attract and persuade nodes that an attacker is their
neighbor. This is especially effective if the attacking
node has a large radio range and enough processing
power to flood an entire area of a network, affecting
a large number of nodes and persuading these nodes
to use the attacker as a relay node in the process.
Packets are lost in this energy consumption DoS attack
due to, for example, distances being too large for
transmission as a node will try to transmit to a non-
neighbor (attacker).
6) Wormhole Attacks: An attacker records the packets
at one location in the network and tunnels those
packets to another area in the network using a long
range wireless channel or optical link. Attackers offer
fewer hops and less delay and entice nodes to use the
attacker to forward packets, thereby causing collisions
and packet loss in this DoS congestion attack.
7) Spoofing: Network nodes can become malicious and
provide an attacker network access, when nodes are
physically available in environments without contin-
ued surveillance and each individual node is not tam-
per proofed due to, generally, cost reasons. Spoofing
is the method of disguising a communication from
an unknown source as being from a known, trusted
source. It can severely harm any WSN, as it is both
difficult to detect and effective. A spoofing situation
can involve either an attacker successfully identifying
as a network node by falsifying data or by transmitting
falsified data with real credentials from a malicious
node. This type of attack is difficult to detect and
requires an IDS which can identify node anomalies.
It is clear from analyzing the above attacks that a detec-
tion algorithm which has both centralized and distributed
features is optimal as the attacks in VI-A, VI-B and
VI-C above could be detected in a distributed structure,
while certain attacks in VI-D will need to be detected
in a centralized structure and others in a distributed
manner; for example, a black hole may fail to generate
application-level acknowledgments that can imply net-
work failure, even though the attacker is sending protocol
level acknowledgments. Another very interesting point
was highlighted in [37], which stated that, in future
attacks, more than one style will likely be used at the
same time and multiple layers will be attacked in a cross-
layer approach. For example, using a sinkhole attack to
guide packets to a specific region so a jammer could jam
a larger area.
E. System Coexistence
This section identifies intrusions from spectrum co-
existence and spectrum sharing fields. Intrusions from
the coexistence of systems in the same frequency range
and when protocols misuse sharing capabilities are dis-
cussed.
1) A secondary user (SU) occupying a primary user’s
(PU) spectrum and causing interference. The SU op-
erates for too long or when the PU is operating and
interferes with the PU’s performance. The intention
was to maximize spectrum use but the SU became an
intruder.
2) An attacker or a certain spectrum user consumes all
resources and deliberately denies spectrum sharing,
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causing other equal users to suffer performance loss
or denial of service.
3) Specific users being saturated by coexisting legitimate
signals, leading to a DoS attack.
In these examples network performance is affected and,
so, intrusions exist. Clearly, a SU occupying a PU’s
channel for too long and affecting the PU’s performance
becomes an attacker. Resources can be denied by, for
example, blocking CTS packets, and so any device
operating as such inherently becomes an intruder. In
spectrum sharing, a cognitive radio (CR) senses for the
absence of a PU (spectrum holes) [38] and a user could
block the discovery of these spectrum holes, becoming
an attacker in the process. This coexistence issue will be
examined in Section VII using Monte-Carlo simulations
and a spectrum analyzer in the ISM band.
VII. DISCUSSION: ATTACKS ON WSNS
Particular WSN attacks and coexistence issues are
discussed here by examining the ZigBee signal model,
described in Section III, and the PER, which, typically,
describes the success of an attack as a successful intru-
sion can be attributed to resulting packet losses. This sub-
area of attacks introduced in section VI are of particular
interest for the expanding IoT sector, which leverages
WSNs, and spectrum usage. Intentional jamming and
spectral coexistence serve as an introduction into IoT
penetration testing, where both potential attackers and
co-existing with other protocols and systems are eval-
uated. Taking this approach can, potentially, identify
application weaknesses in terms of the operating wireless
channel, environment and spectrum. Furthermore, this
focus on ZigBee’s PHY and MAC depicts the perfor-
mance of the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY and MAC, which are
implemented across a variety of WSN protocols. Fig.
4 contains a Matlab simulated subgroup of jamming
attacks and, to highlight the difficulties of a congested
spectrum, ISM band coexistence issues. The effects of
a constant jamming continuous wave (CW) jammer, an
AWGN jammer, an intelligent matched protocol jam-
mer (which here refers to a ZigBee signal and frame
structure (Table II) being used by an intruder to attack
a ZigBee network) and IEEE 802.11b coexistence are
demonstrated. The CW and matched protocol jamming
attacks were first discussed in [29], along with a practical
demonstration of the matched protocol interference. The
approach was practically tested using a ZigBee network
of five XBee nodes and a software defined radio (SDR).
The SDR artificially created an IEEE 802.15.4 signal
and frame structure in Matlab/Simulink to produce the
matched protocol interference, which caused a working
network to fail. This was an example of a learning based
jammer where the packet structure was identified by
eavesdropping on the open interface of the WSN.
The CW response represents a simple jamming attack
as a sine wave is injected into the spectrum (added to
signals during simulations). The jammer-to-signal ratio
(JSR) is significantly higher for a disruptive PER and,
therefore, would be detectable in the spectrum. The
CW response represents the operational mode of many
jammers in Section VI-A as it is, generally, spurious
interference. The matched protocol jammer simulations
show that it is more of a threat to WSNs than conven-
tional CW techniques, while adjacent channels (ZigBee
5 MHz) have little to no effect. At a JSR of 0dB, the
matched interference causes a PER of approximately
0.18 and the signal structure matches expected signals
in the channel. Therefore, the matched interference is
a threat at low JSR values while simultaneously being
difficult to detect. In both the CW and matched pro-
tocol cases, once jamming power rises above a certain
threshold, substantial numbers of packets will be lost,
but this threshold is much lower when the interference
is protocol specific. The AWGN interference is included
to show the difficulty in differentiating noisy congested
networks from attacks. The AWGN attack (white noise
across the spectrum centered on the channel) has more
of an effect on the signal than a CW jammer at JSR
above 11dB. Detecting these attacks would typically be
based on classical spectrum analysis exploiting higher
signal powers and offset spurs. However, matched signal
interference, which causes more damage than CW, is
more difficult to detect as packets resemble those of the
network, meaning that traditional spectrum approaches
may not be appropriate. This amplifies the need for
IDSs to utilize extra available analysis tools, for example,
machine learning, as attackers can discover and mimic
WSN protocols and noisy environments can resemble
attack situations.
The IEEE 802.15.4 based protocols (ZigBee) coexist
with various signals in the ISM RF band, including WiFi
(IEEE 802.11b). This phenomenon was simulated for
the 802.11b 1Mb/s DSSS protocol offset by 2, 3 and
7 MHz, as these offsets relate to the offsets seen by
a ZigBee signal compared to the center of an 802.11b
signal. For example, 802.11b channel 11 (2.462 GHz)
and ZigBee channels 21 (2.455 GHz), 22 (2.460 GHz)
and 23 (2.465 GHz). The simulations show that other
services can act as interference (PER ≥ 0.1 ), given
a high enough JSR (≥ 16.5 dB). These coexistence
issues were experimentally benchtop tested using an
XBee ZigBee peer-to-peer network, multiple PCs and
the Tektronix real time spectrum analyzer (RTSA) 306B
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Figure 4. ZigBee PERs for CW, matched, offset matched and 802.11b coexistence interference for a range of JSRs
Figure 5. Hardware used in experimental setup to highlight the issues in a congested spectrum and to produce the DPX spectrum graphs
for the signals of interest
using a Siretta ZigBee stubby antenna. WiFi signals
(campus WiFi) and/or Bluetooth signals (local devices)
were provided by enabling laptops, phones, and speakers
in the vicinity around one XBee transceiver. The main
hardware utilized is provided in Fig. 5, where the com-
ponents are close together for photographic convenience
only, as the transmitting and receiving XBee devices
were sufficiently separated during testing. Spectrum
graphs are developed using Tektronix’s Digital Phos-
phor technology (DPX), which runs on the SignalVu-
PC software package and acquires signals in real time.
DPX performs hardware digital signal processing and
rasterizing of samples into pixel information, which can
be plotted in real time and as a bitmap image (instead
of a conventional line trace). This allows signals to be
distinguished at the same frequency and a color scheme
is used to identify signals which are more frequent than
others. Here, the 2475 MHz ZigBee channel was used
and a spectral DPX image is shown in Fig. 6a, where
the dark blue is the highest level and corresponds to how
frequent the signal is. All transmitted and received pack-
ets were monitored by using DIGI’s XCTU software,
which provides a graphical user interface for packet
monitoring. Each transmission required an acknowledg-
ment packet, stating either “Delivery Status: Success“ for
a successful transmission or “Delivery Status: Address
not found“ for an unsuccessful transmission. Real time
coexistence issues are visualized in Fig. 6b and Fig.
6c, where the ZigBee signal coexisted with WiFi only
and WiFi/Bluetooth, respectively. Fig. 6d provides the
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(a) DPX image showing the ZigBee signal at 2475 MHz (b) DPX image showing coexistence of ZigBee with 802.11 WiFi
Bluetooth
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(d) DPX image showing the spectral environment when ZigBee
packets were lost
Figure 6. DPX visualization of the ISM RF Spectrum during the benchtop experiments
spectral analysis for when packets were dropped in the
network. These unsuccessful transmissions were due to
the interference caused by multiple devices using WiFi
and Bluetooth in the vicinity of the intended XBee
receiver. This differs from Fig. 6c due to both the higher
power interference signals at 2.475 GHz and recurring
number of transmissions, given by the fuller nature and
more intense color of the DPX image. Compared to Fig.
6c, Fig. 6d has approximately 6dBm higher coexisting
signals and, due to a higher volume of connected devices,
more frequent ISM band transmissions. Essentially, these
benchtop tests provided visual proof of the spectrum
coexistence issues, the noisy environments and legitimate
signal intrusions which exist in WSNs. The undelivered
packets, which occurred under extreme coexistence cir-
cumstances, provided evidence that environments and
coexisting signals can be seen as both unintentional and,
in malicious cases, intentional interference. Therefore,
the detection of both intentional and unintentional in-
terference is important for providing a holistic IDS and
adequate security.
Furthermore, other attacks (Section VI-D) on the
upper layers of the protocol stack can be detected by an-
alyzing both the routing process and network properties.
However, detection can become skewed if the attackers
are subtle about their operation. For example, moni-
toring network operation and implementing a sinkhole
attack that sporadically drops critical packets, which may
mimic PER levels resulting from a noisy environment, or
a wormhole attack tunneling only one of every N pack-
ets. With the threat of legitimate nodes being captured,
detection and security mechanisms need to account for
malicious nodes in the network. Finally, it is clear that an
attacker is either an “outlaw” who breaks spectrum laws
(excessive radiated power) or a “non-compliant” operator
who adheres to broadcast power limitations but simply
refuses to follow protocol operation (service refusing to
give up resources). Additionally, each layer, from the
PHY upwards is vulnerable and it is clear that intrusion
detection and security are complex processes and cannot
simply focus on one aspect but, rather, must examine




Security and intrusion detection, both intentional and
unintentional, is integral for the future of successful
WSN deployments, especially in critical applications,
like aerospace, space-based WSNs, IoT, and using
nanosatellites as relay nodes. Security and IDSs cannot
simply focus on particular attack strategies, they must
also consider coexistence issues as intrusions and need
to recognize that hostile noisy environments exist. Due
to the flexible topology, open interface and power limi-
tations of these WSNs, this is a complex challenge and
needs to be solved to allow WSNs to be used in safety
critical applications and to safely exploit COTS devices
and standardized protocols. Based on the aforementioned
pillars of security (vulnerabilities, requirements, attacks,
and defenses) and attack discussion, future work lies
in security development in terms of intrusion detection,
both intentional and unintentional, and mitigation. Attack
effects on WSNs and the associated signals and analysis
of why each specific security technique is used will be
beneficial. Additionally, the data from the PHY layer
has potential to be investigated as the radio architectures
are usually very similar between wireless standards and
so, by concentrating on the PHY symbol stream and
related measurements, the possibility of designing a
transferable solution exists. This future work entails both
a reactive and detection approach, which has potential
to be environment specific. As the wireless channel is a
non-linear phenomenon, an approach which can model
nonlinearities and adapt to new models is recommended.
From this perspective, a feature/featureless based ma-
chine learning algorithm focused on received samples in
the PHY is seen as an appropriate continuation from this
article. The focus lies in the development of a detection
strategy, which can distinguish between good operating
and interference intensive channels, while classifying the
cause. A machine learning approach seems applicable
due to previous work in non-linear time series [39].
IX. CONCLUSION
This article discussed interference and intrusions in
WSNs in terms of the four pillars of security; vulnerabil-
ities, requirements, attacks, and defenses. An extensive
overview of both WSN security issues and WSN attacks
were provided and two main types of adversaries were
defined; the outlaw, who breaks the spectrum laws, and
the non-compliant operator, who adheres to laws but does
not follow protocol rules. By utilizing ZigBee, certain
attacks were simulated, using Matlab, and it was shown
that matched protocol interference was more of a threat
than conventional CW jamming and, also, harder to
detect. This implies that traditional interference detection
schemes might be inadequate, as intruder signals can
be indistinguishable from legitimate ones. A real time
analysis of coexisting signals causing interference and
denial of service expanded this point and highlighted
the two main types of adversaries. Therefore, the work
in this article implies that WSN can be vulnerable to
interference and/or intrusions, but techniques can be used
to add resilience and detectability. To conclude, this
paper highlighted that if WSNs are to become integrated
into modern society and to be used frequently in critical
applications, like the IoT and aerospace, enhancements
to both security and the detection of intentional and
unintentional intrusions is necessary. Detection strategies
need to advance and look at aspects outside the norm,
for example, received raw bits, while maintaining the
optimization of device resources. Future designs should
encapsulate security at the beginning of the design
process and incorporate an IDS and utilize all layers
from the PHY upwards. The IDS should be able to
characterize the intrusion and be able to distinguish
between intentional and unintentional intrusions.
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